Restore deploy-runner package write authority for Forgejo OCI migration #654
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Reference
coilyco-flight-deck/infrastructure#654
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Observed failure
The first migrated application publisher reached the trusted deploy runner, logged in to Forgejo OCI, built the immutable website image, then Forgejo rejected the push with
unauthorized: reqPackageAccess.Failing run: https://forgejo.coilysiren.me/coilysiren/website/actions/runs/137
Intended image:
forgejo.coilysiren.me/coilysiren/website:8466f5acf84b2f12e78157cf8530d174f76d8bf8The repository publisher is locally proven.
ward exec image-publish-check, tests, image build, image smoke, and the full pre-commit suite passed before commit8466f5alanded. The failed run checked out that commit and completed the Docker build. The failure is therefore in live Forgejo package authorization, not the image source.The failure path also showed that the host deploy runner has no
python3for the optional Telegram alert step. That secondary alert error did not cause the package rejection.Operator action
/forgejo/coilyco-ops/registry-tokenresolves to a Forgejo identity with package-write authority for thecoilysirenowner and every owner named by infrastructure#653. Ops must not reveal the token.coilysiren/websiteprivate and corrects the package or owner authorization that returnsreqPackageAccess.Expected evidence
docker manifest inspect forgejo.coilysiren.me/coilysiren/website:8466f5acf84b2f12e78157cf8530d174f76d8bf8succeeds from an authorized read surface./forgejo/coilyco-ops/registry-read-token.The engineer gathered read-only workflow evidence and did not rerun or mutate live CI/CD.
Parent: infrastructure#653
Authority: coilysiren/inbox#276
Codex, via engineer surface
Repository preparation is ready for the authorization repair:
issue-239-forgejo-ociatd7e3245contains every exact consumer pin, read-only pull Secret, and the Playwright digest mirror.The agent has not rerun publisher CI, pushed a probe commit, landed deploy main, or touched live workloads. Ops can use this issue to restore package write authority, rerun each intended publisher once, and return immutable-manifest plus private-visibility evidence before deploy#239 lands.
Sirens Echo deploy-lane evidence for the existing Forgejo OCI authorization handoff.
Operator action:
No speculative source change or CI rerun was made. The earlier test-job symptom remains separately tracked in coilyco-gaming/sirens-discord-ops#43.
Siren repository-publisher verification is complete.
This clears sirens-discord-ops from the OCI migration queue. Run 42 remains best classified as a rollout-boundary transient, not a source-pattern defect. Its exact first error is irretrievable because Forgejo job-log endpoints return 404 and the prior runner pod was replaced.
Successful run: https://forgejo.coilysiren.me/coilyco-gaming/sirens-discord-ops/actions/runs/44
Siren evidence: coilyco-gaming/sirens-discord-ops#43 (comment)
Infrastructure #654 remains open for the other owner publishers and fleet acceptance.
The deploy-runner package-write authorization repair is complete.
This closes the authorization incident. Remaining registry retirement work stays under infrastructure#653.