sshd: public exposure contradicts tangled-knot 'tailnet-only' comment; do security pass #103

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opened 2026-05-24 18:25:21 +00:00 by coilysiren · 0 comments

coilysiren commented

2026-05-24 18:25:21 +00:00

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Problem

During mobile-SSH debugging today, auth.log on kai-server showed live brute-force scan attempts from public IPs (2.57.122.177, 89.134.210.182, 213.35.128.24, 161.35.139.3). That contradicts the comment in infrastructure/sshd/tangled-knot.conf which states 'SSH stays tailnet-only.'

Observed state on kai-server (snapshot from this debug session)

sshd listening: 0.0.0.0:22 and [::]:22 (all interfaces, including public).
systemctl is-active fail2ban sshguard -> both inactive.
ufw active, rules not verified in this session (no interactive sudo).
Multiple unique public-IP scan attempts logged in the last few minutes - meaning packets are reaching sshd's preauth at minimum.

Likely sources of the gap

Home router port-forwards :22 to kai-server (unintended NAT). Check router config.
sshd was meant to bind to tailscale0 / 127.0.0.1 only and that hardening never landed.
The tangled-knot keyfetch path needs public SSH reachability for git-over-SSH from atproto-registered users (Match User git block). If so, the 'tailnet-only' comment is stale and the security posture relies entirely on the keyfetch denying unknown keys.

Proposed scope for the security pass

Non-exhaustive, ordered by likely payoff:

Verify whether public :22 exposure is intentional (tangled-knot git path) or a router misconfig. Document the decision in docs/k3s-deploy-notes.md or a new docs/ssh-exposure.md.
If exposure must stay for the git user, restrict the kai user to tailnet-only via a Match Address block + a non-default port for the git user, or split the daemons.
Enable fail2ban (or sshguard) with the standard ssh jail. Confirms throttling on bot attempts regardless of upstream answer.
Disable PasswordAuthentication globally if not already; pubkey only. (Need to verify current state - not visible without sudo.)
Disable PermitRootLogin globally. (Need to verify.)
Bind sshd ListenAddress to 100.69.164.66 (tailscale0) + 127.0.0.1 if router forwards aren't required.
Cross-reference with docs/k3s-deploy-notes.md section on tailnet-only services and update if reality differs.

Related

Followed-on from today's mobile-SSH debug session (tracking doc coilysiren/mobile-ssh-debug.md on Kai's workstation).
infrastructure#102 - sshd ClientAlive cleanup (orthogonal but adjacent).

Filed by Claude.

**Problem** During mobile-SSH debugging today, `auth.log` on kai-server showed live brute-force scan attempts from public IPs (`2.57.122.177`, `89.134.210.182`, `213.35.128.24`, `161.35.139.3`). That contradicts the comment in [`infrastructure/sshd/tangled-knot.conf`](https://forgejo.coilysiren.me/coilysiren/infrastructure/src/branch/main/sshd/tangled-knot.conf) which states 'SSH stays tailnet-only.' **Observed state on kai-server (snapshot from this debug session)** - sshd listening: `0.0.0.0:22` and `[::]:22` (all interfaces, including public). - `systemctl is-active fail2ban sshguard` -> both **inactive**. - `ufw` active, rules not verified in this session (no interactive sudo). - Multiple unique public-IP scan attempts logged in the last few minutes - meaning packets are reaching sshd's preauth at minimum. **Likely sources of the gap** 1. Home router port-forwards :22 to kai-server (unintended NAT). Check router config. 2. sshd was meant to bind to tailscale0 / 127.0.0.1 only and that hardening never landed. 3. The tangled-knot keyfetch path needs public SSH reachability for git-over-SSH from atproto-registered users (`Match User git` block). If so, the 'tailnet-only' comment is stale and the security posture relies entirely on the keyfetch denying unknown keys. **Proposed scope for the security pass** Non-exhaustive, ordered by likely payoff: - Verify whether public :22 exposure is intentional (tangled-knot git path) or a router misconfig. Document the decision in `docs/k3s-deploy-notes.md` or a new `docs/ssh-exposure.md`. - If exposure must stay for the `git` user, restrict the `kai` user to tailnet-only via a `Match Address` block + a non-default port for the git user, or split the daemons. - Enable fail2ban (or sshguard) with the standard ssh jail. Confirms throttling on bot attempts regardless of upstream answer. - Disable `PasswordAuthentication` globally if not already; pubkey only. (Need to verify current state - not visible without sudo.) - Disable `PermitRootLogin` globally. (Need to verify.) - Bind sshd `ListenAddress` to `100.69.164.66` (tailscale0) + `127.0.0.1` if router forwards aren't required. - Cross-reference with [`docs/k3s-deploy-notes.md`](https://forgejo.coilysiren.me/coilysiren/infrastructure/src/branch/main/docs/k3s-deploy-notes.md) section on tailnet-only services and update if reality differs. **Related** - Followed-on from today's mobile-SSH debug session (tracking doc `coilysiren/mobile-ssh-debug.md` on Kai's workstation). - [infrastructure#102](https://forgejo.coilysiren.me/coilysiren/infrastructure/issues/102) - sshd ClientAlive cleanup (orthogonal but adjacent). **Filed by Claude.**

coilysiren referenced this issue

2026-05-24 18:27:07 +00:00

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2026-05-24 20:00:26 +00:00

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